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The linguistic paradigm
Postmodern and deconstructivist theorists focus,
in most cases, on formal or visual properties of ar-
chitecture (the use of certain geometrical shapes,
of iconic forms, etc.), which are said to embody a
certain meaning or message, or as deconstructing
a certain discourse. Charles Jencks and Mark Wig-
ley6 offer paradigmatic examples. The main point
of critique is, firstly, that a definition of architec-
ture through its visual properties is a very particu-
lar and narrow point of view. It detaches the ob-
ject from their immersion in practices and isolates
them in order contemplate their meaning.7 The
distance of visual apprehension accounts, on the
one hand, for the fact that there are formally simi-
lar architectural settings with different success or
acceptance.8 This distance or detachment is, on
the other hand, necessary for any interpretation,
for it invites the ”play of the signifier“ (Roland Bar-
thes). But it also, secondly, makes space for diffe-
rent codes to be applied, which correspond to dif-
ferent taste cultures and different forms of habitus.
For Pierre Bourdieu, formal and semantic readings
of artefacts depend on the academic habitus. The
academic habitus is characterized by having time
(time to contemplate) and being not involved, i.e.
distanced and disengaged. It tends to miss out the
bodily, the unconscious and the collective dimen-
sion of how architecture is experienced. This con-
struction transforms practically engaged objects in-
to objects of contemplation, the timeliness of
practical, mainly unselfconscious engagement gi-
ves way to the suspended time of conscious con-
templation, bodily inscribed patterns of behavior
are substituted by an immobile eye, the subject as
a social agent gives way to a subject enmeshed in
signifying structures, etc. Going through these
transformations, architecture turns into an object,
thrown vis-à-vis a subject that underlies its con-
struction, which then calls for ”uninterested“ con-
textualization: ”it seeks to be deciphered, we must
find signs within it ...,“ writes Roland Barthes of
the city of Paris, distanced through the position of
the observer on the Eiffel Tower.9 For Bourdieu in
Social Sense, this leads not only to a confusion of
the user’s codes of reception with the architect’s
aesthetic codes, but furthermore to an overall
doubt in the usefulness of the ”textual paradigm“
in an analysis of performative effects of the built
environment. Against a method that focuses on
meaningful units within an act of understanding,
one can quote Marshall McLuhan: ”Everybody ex-
periences far more than he understands. Yet it is
experience, rather than understanding, that influ-
ences behavior.“
The consequence of this criticism for any inter-
pretation of the more directly performative func-
tion of architecture is that only those practices
should count as relevant which are common, soci-
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How does architecture function as a medium to
structure, facilitate or prevent social and individual
practices? And how can this power of architecture
best be conceptualised? In order to discuss these
questions, I will take up the literal meaning of the
word medium and try to locate the political or so-
cial power of architecture in its function to me-
diate between two particular socio-cultural ”spa-
ces“, to serve as in-between of different areas, to
set up a boundary, to demarcate a difference, and
to qualify separations and points of communicati-
on. Modernism held it axiomatic that architecture
exerts socio-political power. Le Corbusier went as
far as to claim that only architecture can provide
remedy for social matters: ”On the day when con-
temporary society, at present so sick, has become
properly aware that only architecture ... can provi-
de the exact prescription for its ills, then the time
will have come for the great machine to be put in
motion.“1 And as late as 1967, Walter Gropius
defined the modern, functionalist architect as the
”Apollo of the democracy.“2 Despite its antago-
nism to modernist doctrines, much of contempor-
ary architectural theory (of either Derridean or De-
leuzean bent) sticks to this concept of a strong
socio-political function of architecture. For Jacques
Derrida, architecture partakes centrally in the con-
ceptual construction of our world. Architecture,
through its close relationship to concepts of struc-
ture, order and hierarchy, helps regulate ”all of
what is called Western culture.“3 Architecture
grasps the very core of our identity: ”We appear to
ourselves only through an experience of spacing
which is already marked by architecture.“4
Since architecture is a multi-dimensional phe-
nomenon which harbors contradictory logics, as
Robert Venturi prominently emphasized, and since
society is even more complicated, it is difficult to
argue with analytical rigour for any clear and de-
terministic relationship between architecture and
social processes. This insight has in the past led to
wholesale rejections of any strong political func-
tion of architecture. Leon Krier, to name only one,
used to argue against any deterministic political
function of architecture. In defence of Albert
Speer’s architectural classicism, he writes: ”There is
neither authoritarian nor democratic architecture,
no more than there are authoritarian or democra-
tic Wienerschnitzel. Architecture is not political; it
is only an instrument of politics.“5
This paper will add an argument to this on-
going debate. To do so, I will briefly critizise one
model, dominant for decades, of interpreting the
relation between architecture and society or poli-
tics: the model of language, meaning, representa-
tion or text. Since criticism of this paradigm is well
known, I will keep my critique short and mention
only one argument, which will help to formulate
an alternative conceptual approach.
ally shared and figure in everyday practice. Archi-
tecture influences social behavior only insofar it
partakes in the construction of everyday practices
and is perceived as such by the agents of these
practices. Architectural space is, on this level of
analysis, embodied space. Not only the big sym-
bols of architecture are in question – the Classical
Orders, the monuments, or a deconstruction of
these – but the small symbols, the ways in which
architecture organizes, hierarchizes and systemati-
zes activities, behaviors, orderings, visibilities,
movements. The question is, then: How can archi-
tecture epistemologically be constructed as an ent-
ity that acts as a medium in this sense? 
Architecture as difference 
One description of architecture as a boundary with-
in or between different socio-cultural and behavi-
oral contexts is offered by Rem Koolhaas’ text on
the Berlin Wall.10 Koolhaas suggests that the Berlin
Wall can serve as a model for a concept of archi-
tecture: it is a material structure where one comes
”eye to eye with architecture’s true nature.“11 The
true nature of architecture is revealed when one re-
alizes that its impact – its meaning, its function, its
effects – is utterly independent of its formal appea-
rance, which is in constant flux.12 Its significance
derives, more directly, from the host of performan-
ces, rituals, scripted behaviors it instigates: from
the rituals of legal border crossings to the illegal at-
tempts to cross it through tunnels, to daily routines
of inspections (military in the East, touristic in the
West.). And, at the most serious level of ”event“,
the wall was the stage for numerous deaths. The
source of its meaning lies not in its materiality or
form, but in the fact that it mediates between dif-
ferent socio-political contexts: through the marking
of a boundary, the mise-en-scene of a political bor-
derline or the marking of a qualitative difference.
Koolhaas writes: ”Were not division, enclosure
(i.e., imprisonment), and exclusion – which defined
the wall’s performance and explained its efficiency
– the essential stratagems of any architecture?“13
The idea to see the ”nature“ of architecture in
setting up a boundary is in tune with post-meta-
physical philosophy. Martin Heidegger, for exam-
ple, writes: ”A boundary is not that at which some-
thing stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the
boundary is that from which something begins its
presencing.“14 For post-metaphysical philosophy
generally, it is the edge, the boundary, the parer-
gon, the limit, the difference that took the place of
ousia or essence in traditional ontology. Difference
is not only epistemological precondition for (con-
ceptual) identities, but is played out on the level of
facticity of beings, as negotiation of boundaries, as
claiming of territories, as setting up of qualitative
differences.
In contrast to language-based approaches, I pro-
pose, as a heuristic device, that architecture works
on a fundamental level the same way as the Berlin
Wall: architecture is a stretched, diversified, inter-
nally structured wall, or a complex of screens and
filters. A material boundary, be it drawn or built,
be it soft, hard, permeable, fortified, inviting, in-
terrogating, repulsing or neutral, derives its rele-
vant qualities primarily not from its material pre-
sence, but from its immersion in networks of wider
socio-economic structures, and from the interven-
tion it marks, micropolitically, in them. Architectu-
rally, a boundary becomes interesting according to
the qualities of the (socio-economic) ’spaces‘ on
each side, and the negotiating practices between
these qualities. To illustrate this claim, I will stick
to ”simple,“ basic and material forms of mediation,
in contrast to technologically arranged forms of
interactive architecture. 
Forms of mediation 
The idea that architecture exerts its social effects
in being a system of physical enclosures is promi-
nent in anthropology and in architectural theory.15
The principal, most basic, most brutal function of a
wall is to create a strong boundary. Architecture,
in this case, turns into a non-medium: its function
is to impede any flow of material, bodies and in-
formation, or to reduce it to a certain degree, ser-
ving the purpose of isolation, exclusion and purity.
For Aristotle, the principal function of the city wall
lies in this: by walling off the hostile nature, human
nature is free to unfold, peace and happiness can
evolve16 (fig. 1). Similar ideas were prominent in
the Enlightenment era: The French rationalist phi-
losopher Claude-Adrien Helvetius held that an ear-
ly interest in flowers can be stimulated by locking
a child up in a room that is entirely empty but for
a pot of flowers. The isolated existence of flowers
would leave a lasting impression on the tabula rasa
of his memory, which would stimulate a lasting in-
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the civilized world
terest in flowers and even could make the young
man a painter of flowers.17 He reasons like Aristot-
le: By isolating, a purified realm can be establish-
ed, the essence can unfold. For Robin Evans, who
traced parts of the history of the wall, its most im-
portant feature in architectural history was to iso-
late in order to expel ”the terrors of overcommuni-
cation.“18 He sums up his brief historical account
of the wall: ”The cumulative effect of architecture
during the last two centuries has been like that of
a general lobotomy performed on society at large,
obliterating vast areas of social experience. It is ...
an agency for peace, security and segregation
which, by its very nature, limits the horizon of ex-
perience – reducing noise-transmission, differenti-
ating movement patterns, suppressing smells,
stemming vandalism, cutting down the accumula-
tion of dirt, impeding the spread of disease, veiling
embarrassment, closeting indecency and abolis-
hing the unnecessary; incidentally reducing daily
life to a private shadow-play.“19 (fig. 2)
Although Evans does not refer to Mary Doug-
las, he interprets architecture in the light of her
pure-impure distinction.20 Architecture establishes
purified realms where certain concepts of the good
can unfold by excluding all that does not match
and by radically reducing or selecting all sorts of
transmission. The paradigm of an architecture of
exclusion is the prison. But architecture that serves
the means of strict isolation is the exception. Far
more often, architecture mediates between two
spaces: it sets up a filter, structures communicati-
on, arranges points of contact and transition, etc.
The architectonic paradigms of this filter- or me-
diating function are entry- and threshold situati-
ons. ”A step through the thinnest of all doors is
enough to leave one world and enter another,“
writes Rudolf Arnheim.21 From the domus to the
late-medieval Bürgerhaus, from the city palais of
the 18th century to the palaces of the 19th century,
the entry situation has drawn architectural fantasy,
artistic expenses and social expressivity. It marks a
decisive border – legally, psychologically, histori-
cally; it is the place of encounter of private inside
and public outside, the appellation of the other,
the intrusion into my world. Since a spatial struc-
ture marked by a boundary or threshold is crucial
for religious experience (the word temple derives
from temno, to cut), the meaning of thresholds
has had, sometimes until today, a ritual and reli-
gious dimension. Uncountable rituals surrounded
windows, doors and thresholds, and some of them
are still alive. It was custom in many cultures to
bury the dead under the threshold, as e. g. in Gre-
ece, where the threshold is one of the ”stages“ of
burying the dead, moving historically from the in-
side of the house, from the stove, to the outside.22
The threshold, hence, for long continued to be the
locus of spirits and rituals: harmful ones (in anti-
quity, in order to could harm an enemy, one buried
something under the threshold, like nails of a
coffin or bones or human hair), apotropaic ones (in
lower Germany, it was usual to carry the coffin of a
suspect dead below the raised threshold out of the
house to block its return) and uncountable others,
esp. concerning liminal experiences in life, such as
birth, adolescence, marriage, etc.23 This ritual and
religious dimension of the threshold is often bound
up with bodily constraints: In Northern European
block-houses, a raised threshold, the drischbel,
made the entry way very low, requiring to bow
down in order to enter, which was explicitly un-
derstood as a gesture of submission by assuming a
position of defencelessness when entering.24
Gates possessed similar significance. The god of
gates, Janus was worshipped in one of the most
ancient temples in Rome, which had the form of a
passage between two parallel walls with arched
gates at either end – which were shut in peacetime
and opened in war25 (fig. 3). This temple manife-
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2 | Experimental cell partition walls for the Millbank Peniten-
tiary, by Michael Faraday and Abel Blouet; the goal was to
prevent as far as possible all communication between the priso-
ners confined in contiguous cells. By using irregular surfaces,
the pattern of sound waves should be scrambled, words should
lose their definition
3 | The Temple of Janus, a coin minted to commemorate one of
the rare occasions when its gates had been shut
sted a passage from one side to another, e.g. from
war to peace. Janus was the gate personified: he
was the god of all beginnings and openings, ma-
ster of the first month (January), god of mornings
and watcher of birth. As openings in boundaries
and walls join two spaces, Janus had two faces.
But also in other cultures, the gates of cities, towns
and forts were protected by hybrid creatures: scor-
pion-men, bull-men and lion-men and women,
like the Egyptian sphinx.26
Gates were important for different reasons on a
socio-economic scale. Not only did one pass in and
out by the city gate, it was also a place where one
waited, waiting for the guards to check one’s
goods, to pay one’s toll, and, waiting, chatted,
drank, and slept. The outside of the gate therefore
assumed an importance of its own; inns were built
there and the seeds of new extra-mural communi-
ties were sown. A faubourg, a false town, was thus
established, a parasite attaching itself to one of the
citys’ lifelines.27
Boundary situations can also be employed by
architects. Beatriz Colomina offers a lucid interpre-
tation of the function of a wall in Adolf Loos’ hou-
se for Josephine Baker (1928; fig. 4). This specifi-
cally complex wall embodies a form of breakdown
between inside and outside. As usual for Loos, the
look is turned away from the outside world onto
the inside. But in this project, the subject and ob-
ject of the gaze are reversed. The inhabitant, Jose-
phine Baker, is now the primary object, and the
visitor, the guest, it she looking subject. The most
intimate space – the swimming pool, paradigm of
a sensual space – occupies the center of the house,
and is also the focus of the visitor’s gaze.28
Other architectural elements that serve as am-
bivalent space layers between outside and inside
are verandas, pergolas, arcades, galleries, covered
walkways, etc. Riegler/Riewe often employ this
means. Facades become membranes, they become
an accessible, transformable and vital ”in-bet-
ween“ zone (fig. 5). In the unrealised Study Center
for the Technical University Graz, the building has
a translucent outer shell which can be opened in
part and would have exposed the movement in
and through the building. 
How to build a theory?
Depending on the point of view, an individual or a
group or a building or something else can be de-
scribed as an unitary, homogeneous phenomenon
as much as a heterogeneous, complex, or rhizoma-
tic one. Saying this should not be seen as a plea
for a total relativism, but as a reminder of the epi-
stemological problem of the context of reference.
Every statement and every concept is dependent
on a discourse, on certain theoretical agendas and
non-scientific biases. The more abstract the con-
cept, the more it is functionally dependent on
these contexts. To illustrate this problem with re-
gard to the main concepts this essay employs, I
will discuss a prominent and ambitious theoretical
project that conceptualises architecture in a similar
way as proposed here, as a system of boundaries:
Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson’s notion of a ”soci-
al logic of space.“ (fig. 6 and 7)
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5 | Riegler/Riewe, Technical University Graz, studies center,
unrealized project, 1991
6 | Four theoretical buildings with identical geometrics
For Hillier and Hanson, the simplest building
form is the cell: a boundary, a space within, an en-
trance, and a space outside which is qualified
through its relation to the entry. A building is a
partition of a cell, a settlement is a cluster of cells.
Their basic axiom is that ”human spatial organisati-
on (settlements and buildings) is the establishment
of patterns of relationships composed essentially
of boundaries and permeabilities of various
kinds“29 and that ”the spatial organisation is ... the
organising principle of social reproduction.“30 This
is considered a clear-cut narrative that even allows,
in further stages of development, for some degrees
of formalization and mathematical treatment of
spatial patterns or configurations. In order to for-
malize, the elements (architectural boundaries)
must be well defined to the degree of univocity.
To achieve this, their conceptual value must be
numerical, representing degrees of a certain preci-
sely described quality. The word ’precise‘ derives
form prae-cidere, to cut off, which means for con-
cepts that precise ones describe only one, isolated
experiential dimension or parameter, cutting off all
others. The experiential parameter described in
Hillier and Hanson’s diagrams is, as they write,
”encounter patterns.“ In order to build a model,
they further introduce the concept of randomness:
Architecture structures an otherwise random en-
counter pattern. They write: It is a ”basic, unstruc-
tured awareness of others“ that is ”powerfully in-
fluenced by architectural form.“31 To sum up their
premise: Architecture is conceptualised as a sys-
tem of boundaries that structure society at a fun-
damental level which is that of initially random
encounter patterns. 
But what is implied in this concept? What do
their diagrams presuppose, what do they explain?
If architecture is a system of boundaries, what do
they bound? Instead of encounter patterns one
should talk more precisely of physical proximity
patterns of physical bodies and visibility as such.
People can be very close and/or see each other
without any ”encounter“ taking place. Nor can one
accept their idea that architecture implies order as
restriction of an otherwise random process. It is
hard to believe that in the absence of architecture
– say on an open field – encounter patterns would
happen randomly. This would imply that there are
no other determining factors at all. Finally, their
conception of encounter patterns assume a very
limited categorical framework. The structure of
space interfaces two kinds of relations: those
among the inhabitants of the system (those who
own or inhabit the space), and those between in-
habitants and strangers. But is it really true, one
might ask, that all encountered people are always
categorized as inhabitants or strangers? Only in
rare cases, for example in an exclusive polo club,
the category ”inhabitant“ is clearly defined through
membership and social standing. Non-members
are recognized as strangers, as long as they do not
work there. But even here, encounters between
inhabitants or between inhabitants and strangers
have hardly anything in common that is indepen-
dent from other factors as appearance, gender or
age. Additionally, the factor ”architecture“ cannot
define the category ”stranger.“ In order to use ar-
chitecture as an explanatory pattern, these proble-
matic notions have to be defined by other means.
Other cultural modes of perception must define
who counts as stranger and who does not. Hence,
it is inaccurate at least to assume that architecture
is a ”fundamental dimension“ of society. 
Reversals
Although theories that try to approach architectu-
re as a system of thresholds or boundaries with
scientific rigor tend to tumble into epistemological
problems, many architects and theorists today
strive for a recovery of the ritual power of architec-
ture – they acknowledge that the boundaries are
the places where things happen, but enact a rever-
sal: the goal is not to create purity, exclusion, iso-
lation through strong territorial markers but a hyb-
rid condition, continuous transformation, smooth
spaces, etc. Boundaries are weakened by softening
their architectural definition, by hybridising them
via interactive media or simply by maximising
boundary lines between different functional zones
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7 | Permeability maps of fig. 6
in order to create maximal interaction, e.g. in Rem
Koolhaas’ project for Parc de La Villette. The Ro-
man god Janus who had two clear faces looking in
opposite directions is replaced by the Manimal
which combines the characteristics of man, lion
and snake in one ambiguous image, standing for
hybridity, continuity and indecidability. Boundaries
are deliberately softened, weakened or stretched,
but their significance is confirmed through negati-
on (fig. 8).
This ideology reflects the debate on public spa-
ce. It is typical for many contemporary writers to
value messiness, diversity, communication across
socio-cultural boundaries, heterogeneity, uncer-
tainty, disorder, even ”risk,“ ”tension,“ or ”pain“32
over purity. Democracy is or must be characteri-
zed, today, by the absence of an organic unity, by
conflict and difference. Public space, writes Rosa-
lyn Deutsch, ”is structured around an impossibility
and is therefore irrevocably split by antagonisms.“33
For Setha M. Low, ”public spaces ... are places
where disagreements can be marked symbolically
and politically or personally worked out.“34 When
Richard Sennett describes the suburb in a similar
vein as a purified social space,35 he identifies a
spatial boundary with a moral one and contains
this distinction within a moral judgement: seclu-
sion and purity is bad, openness and mixture is
good. But this reversal is, at least in its most ex-
treme forms, just the flipped coin of Aristotelian
essentialism. Heterogeneity as such is as little es-
sentially good as homogeneity can be, since both
are relational and highly context-dependent con-
cepts. Richard Sennett inadvertendly displays this
dilemma through an inconsistent use of examples,
for example in his account of the Jewish ghetto in
Venice.36 A rigorously separated area with a high
degree of enforced cultural homogeneity turned
out to be one of the most productive centres of
Jewish culture. Cultural homogeneity was, in this
case, highly creative.
Apart from this, social differences are, in many
cases, not spatially identical with architectural
ones. Even a strong boundary, such as a heavy
front door in a typical suburban house in the Uni-
ted States may not be the primary territorial mar-
ker. Instead of the door, the boundary line is alrea-
dy marked by the edge of the well-mowed lawn.
Or take a house wall along a sidewalk. Often, for
commercial uses, the space between wall and
street is occupied, e. g. to display wares in front of
a shop window, to create sidewalk cafés, etc. In
these cases, architecturally unmarked boundary
lines transgress the assumed property lines. The
territory withdraws when the shops are closing.
Built form may only suggest boundaries, the per-
manent form is subjected to interpretation.37 In
these examples, it is the performative context that
finally decides where boundaries are drawn. The
cell which determines forms of encounter in Hillier
and Hanson’s theory is in most cases temporally
and spatially soft, depending on practices and per-
formances. One could exaggerate and maintain
that architectural boundaries do not determine
social ones but the inverse is the case: since archi-
tectural boundaries are always soft, it is social
practices that determine their precise location. And
since they are always soft, there is no need to try
to dissolve them, because they would loose their
meaning entirely: boundaries will be drawn by
non-architectural means, then. 
Jonathan Z. Smith, a theorist in religious and
ritual studies, makes an argument for strong spatial
boundaries. He writes that the primary function of
the marked-off space of the temple is to demarca-
te a difference. Once admitted into the temple,
the ordinary becomes significant and sacred. For
him, it is enough to draw a boundary in order to
invite meaning which, in turn, justifies the bound-
ary.38 Against the inverted essentialist position de-
scribed above, one can argue with Jonathan Smith
for the positive effects of strong spatial bound-
aries, of exclusion and inclusion, of isolation. Only
by affirming a boundary, by constructing a strong
boundary, meaning is invited. For Boris Groys, mu-
seums, for example, need isolation from the urban
and social fabric, from economic restraints and
everyday activities, they need to establish a ”puri-
fied realm“ in order to make contemplation of
wider issues possible. Museums and other paradig-
matic structures of isolation – schools, hospitals,
military camps, shopping malls and polo clubs –
provide not only ideological indoctrination, social
segregation and discipline, but also positive and
potentially creative effects. The paradigm of this
architecture would not be the prison but rather
the refrigerator – and who would want to live
without a refrigerator today? 
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